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Introduction
One of the fundamental questions in the realm of political philosophy and political economy concerns the extent to which, and the spheres within which, the tnarket should be replaced by the governtnent (i.e. non-n1arket n1odes of production, price setting and distribution). During the post-war period, the labour market has been at the centre of this debate. Essentially 2 opposing schools of thought can be identified.
On the one hand, there have been those, usually of a conservative ideological disposition, who have argued that wage detennination should be left entirely to the n1arket (Brittan and Lilley, 1977 ) . The governrnent's role , it is asserted, should be restricted to preserving property rights, ensuring that individuals and groups fulfil their contractual obligations, guaranteeing freedon1 of association, preventing the forn1ation of producer monopolies, and outlawing certain restrictive , or socially hannful, labour n1arket practices. In no circumstances, except perhaps with respect to its own e1nployees, should the state be directly involved in pay fixing . Hence , in accordance with this approach, incon1es policies of virtually any form, even including tripartite consultations of the kind currently in vogue in New Zealand, would be ruled out , either as a tnatter of principle or because of their expected harmful effects on economic efficiency, growth and en1ployment.
On the other hand, there have been those, norn1ally of a socialist or social den1ocratic persuasion, who have contended that the detennination of wages should not be left entirely to the forces of supply and demand. This view is based partly on the assun1ption that n1arket outcon1es will con:flict with widely-held notions of distributive justice; but it is also based on the premise that free or unrestrained collective bargaining in the context of a highly unionised economy and a substantial degree of distributional dissent (i.e. conflict over income shares) will result in a socially unacceptable and ecoamntcally fnefftcleat level of unemployment (Flanagan, Soskice and Ulman, 1983; I 1982 ).
Since it would be both morally indefensible and politically in • free IO(ffety to abolish unions, or even to severely reduce their bargaining power, the only responatble solution lies in employing certain non-market mechanisms, firstly to restrain the use of union power, and secondly to ensure that the wage riXfng system is structured in order to minimise the problem of externalities. In practical terms this hu meant a commitment to some form of incomes policy, normally of a voluntary nature, and a preference for rasonably centralised pay fixing systems based on industrial, rather than occupational, bargaining groups.
For much of the post-war era the latter school of thought has dominated the policymaking institutions of most OECD countries. Certainly this has been true in New Zealand (Boston, 1984) . Indeed, few democratic countries have relied as heavfiy as New Zealand on non-market forms of wage and price control. For example, between March 1971 and July 1985, a period of some 14% years, statutory wage controls of one kind or another were in force for at least 9 years. Moreover, of the remaining S% years, only 8 months can be legitimately regarded as a period of free collective bargaining (i.e. December 1972 - August 1973) . During the rest of the time governments sought by every means short of statutory intervention (moral suasion, political pressure, threats to re-introduce regulations, the offer of tax cuts, and so forth) to slow the growth of nominal wages.
The fact that New Zealand's economic performance has been relatively poor since the mid-1970s, especially with respect to inflation and the growth of output and employment, has prompted many observers to conclude that this protracted attempt to restrain wages and prices through non-market instruments has been a dismal fafiure (Treasury, 1984; OECD, 1985) . Partly on the basis of such a judgement, it is contended that we have no choice but to place our reliance upon more orthodox market-orientated forms of wage and price control. Unless we do so the labour market will continue to operate inefficiently, relative wages will fail to adjust properly to changing employment conditions, antiquated ideas, attitudes and working practices will continue to pervade our manufacturing industries, and unemployment will remain at unnecessarily high levels. At the risk of some over-simplification, it can be argued that the "more-market solution", which is now fashionable both in New Zealand and overseas, consists of the following basic elements:
(i) a sole dependence on monetary and fiscal policies to restore price stability; (ii) an assumption that the adjustment costs associated with a disinflationary strategy can be substantially lowered by convincing the market that supply shocks (both wage and non-wage) will not be accommodated; (iii) a rejection of all formal, explicit incomes policies, including wage guidelines and comprehensive price controls; {iv) a determination to weaken the organisational strength of the union movement by curbing the closed shop, preventing secondary picketing, and making strikes more costly for workers; (v) measures to increase the responsiveness of wages to market forces by decentralising the pay fixing system in both the private the public sectors, curbing job security provisions, cutting unemployment benefits, lowering (or removing entirely) minimum wage provisions, and reducing the importance of historic relativities and coercive comparisons in wage bargaining; and (vi) measures to deregulate other markets, foreign exchange markets, capital markets and product markets, where deemed desirable. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Nor have the items been listed In a descending order of importance. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that the Labour Government in New Zealand is not committed to all aspects of this neo-conservative policy package.
Indeed, the Government has completely ~ected point (iv),js ill-disposed to many aspects of point (v), and has not yet ruled out wage guidelines or selective price controls. At the same time, however, the Government clearly endorses points (i), (ii) and (vi) , and is also keen to "free-up" the wage fixing system, point (v), by encouraging industry and work- '· Incomes policy 6 7 place bargaining, reducing the importance and coverage of national awards, and ensuring that arguments based on relativities do not dominate the bargaining process to the same extent as they have in the past.
This shift to a market-orientated policy stance by many OECD governments since the late 1970s raises many important questions: How are we to account for the disintegration of the previous policy consensus, founded, at least in part, on Keynesian assurnptions? How are we to explain the fact that Labour Governn1ents in both Australia and New Zealand are pursuing very si.Inilar policies to the Conservative Administrations in Britain and Norway? Why is it that the Australian Labour Governtnent has opted to reinstate a centralised wage fixing system -based on the Conciliation and Arbitration Com1nission and 6~1nonthly cost of living adjustments -wheras the Labour Government here has chosen the path to a more decentralised system? And perhaps most i.Inportant of all, what are the prospects of the more-n1arket approach in New Zealand achieving its clain1ed advantages? In particular, will the atte1npt to restrain wages and prices primarily through the forces of supply and demand (i.e. in the context of a firm, non-accommodating tnonetary policy) work in the manner desired, or will non-market failure si.Inply be replaced by Inarket failure? To put it more bluntly, will the next year or so witness a wage explosion with all the associated negative consequences? It is obviously not possible in a short article to explore such issues in any depth. The intention, therefore, is to focus on a limited range of subjects, natnely, the validity of the credibility hypothesis, some of the advantages and disadvantages of the planned move to a more fragmented and less relativity-driv, en pay flXing system, the prospects for the 1985/86 wage round, and the Government's options in the event of an excessive rise in money wages.
Monetary policy and the credibility hypothesis Two theoretical propositions, usually associated with the tnonetarist school of thought , lie at the heart of the Labour Government's counter-inflation strategy. Both are controversial in character. The first proposition asserts that control of the money supply is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the attainment of price stability. Hence, in accordance with this view, it is contended that as long as the Government pursues a stable, firm , predictable and non-accommodating monetary policy, the domestic rate of inflation -after a certain lag -will be brought down to an acceptable level (i.e. a level roughly consistent with those of New Zealand's major trading partners). The second proposition, which is often referred to as the credibility hypothesis, can be stated as follows: the greater the credibility with which a government's counter~inflation policy is viewed by price setters, the faster the adjustment of wages and prices, and the smaller the costs -in terms of lost output and employn1ent -of a disinflationary n1onetary policy (Cagan and Fellner, 1983 ; Kozon1zay, 1982; Perry, 1983; Taylor, 1982) .
How valid is the first proposition? The evidence tends to support the assertion that inflation can be controlled, at least in the medium-to-long term, by means of a firn1 monetary policy. Having said this, however, it should be noted iinmediately that for son1e countries there appear to be very considerable adjustment costs associated with a reliance solely on traditional policy instruments (Suiter and Miller, 1983) . Moreover, control of the money supply is neither a sufficient, nor even a necessary, condition for restraining wage and price inflation in the short term (i.e. between 1-2 years).
The second proposition , the credibility hypothesis, is open to very serious doubt. In the first place, if a government's economic strategy is to be deerned Hcredible '', certain highly restrictive conditions n1ust be satisfied. In practice it is i.Inprobable that they will be. In the second place, even in the unlikely event that a governtnent's econon1ic strategy is perceived by all the decisive actors in the economy to be credible , this will not be sufficient to ensure that wages and prices adjust in the manner , or with the speed, intended. Thus, the transition costs often associated with a so-called "orthodox" disinflationary strategy will not necessarily be reduced significantly, let alone avoided entirely, by the mere attainment of "policy credibility".
In analysing the credibility hypothesis it is useful, as Kozomzay ( 1982) has pointed out, to distinguish between 3 separate kinds of credibility. To start with, there is the question of whether a government's economic policies are credible in themselves. That is to say, are there grounds for believing that the policies being implemented are logically consistent, sensible, plausible and directed towards the goverrunent's chosen ends? Next, there is the question of whether a government can be relied upon to pursue its stated policies with consistency, resolution and perseverence, notwithstanding any adverse shorttenn political and economic consequences? Lastly, there is the matter of whether a government can be regarded as credible? Can it reasonably be assumed, for instance, that those in power will survive for a sufficient length of tim, e to see their policies fully impletnented and brought to fruition? While it can be argued that the desired behavioural response is in some sense dependent on all 3 kinds of ~'credibility" being realised, for our present purposes the 1nost relevant category is the second, namely, whether a government can be trusted to stick to its declared strategy come what may.
As noted earlier, the Labour Government and its economic advisers are committed to reducing the current rate of inflation and plan to achieve this objective by exerting strict control over the 1noney supply. To quote fro1n the Treasury 1 s briefing paper to the 1985 Tripartite Wage Conference (TWC):
Monetary policy will suport a steady reduction in the rate of inflation ... The liquidity base is being managed so as to substantially reduce the growth in nominal (as opposed to real) national income over the next few years ... Although it is difficult to be precise, the current policy setting is likely to be consistent with nominal growth in national income in the order of 10-13 percent in 1985/86, falling to around 7-9 percent in 1986/87 (Treasury, 1985 B, p. 3 and p. 13) .
One obvious question prornpted by this approach is how the reduced growth in nominal national inco1ne will be Hsplit" between prices and quantities. That is to say, will the inflation rate exceed the Governrnent's norninal income target, thereby choking off growth in real output and employment, or will the inflation rate decline steadily, as intended, thereby enabling economic growth to continue, albeit at a slower pace? In short, will there be significant adjustment costs?
The Treasury, for one, acknowledges that such Jnatters are ~'difficult ... to judge'' (Treasury, 1985B, p. 13) . Nevertheless, invoking the credibility hypothesis, the Treasury argues that rnuch "will depend on the degree of confidence the private sector has in the current policy being 1naintained ... '' (Treasury, 1985B, p. 13) . What this means is that if it is known in advance that the Governn1ent is detern1incd not to ratify or accon1modate wage and price increases above a certain level, and if it is widely believed that the Government will not alter course in the face of a pay explosion, then wage negotiators (and other price setters) are much less likely to press for unacceptably large increases. This being so) the rate of inflation will be held in check and there will be reasonable scope for a growth in output and etnployrnent.
More specifically, the credibility of a non-accon1n1odating 1nonetary policy is thought to ''work'', in the sense of making the short-run Phillip's Curve steeper and hence lowering the transition costs of a disinflationary policy, through at least 3 separate, but equally direct, mechanisrns. To start with, the tnore credible a government's monetary policy is believed to be, the more rapidly it is thought that inflationary expectations will adjust downwards. Thus, for exatnple, it is argued that if union negotiators expect the rate of inflation to fall during the currency of their forthcorning settlernents, they will agree to stnaller money-wage deals. If this behavioural response is n1ore or less universal, then the rate of wage inflation will fall and in due course there will be further downward pressure on the rate of price inflation.
(
Another n1echanis1n through which policy credibility is expected to work is by convincing workers of the negative consequences which will result frotn excessive wage increases. In other words, it is contended that if union negotiators are certain that the Governinent will stick firmly to its non-accom1nodating economic strategy, and if they wish to preserve existing employ1nent levels (which it is assumed they do), they. will not take the risk of pressing big wage claims. In a silnilar fashion it is asserted that policy \ credibility will increase the resistance of e1nployers to excessive wage dernands. This is because finns will recognise that if there is a large increase in their labour costs, they rnay have to contend with a significant fall in demand for their products, a decline in profitability, and possibly severe liquidity problen1s (Douglas, 1985, p. 10) .
A brief critique
The credibility hypothesis is unlikely to operate as intended unless (a) there is a relatively low level of distributional dissent and bargaining intensity; (b) there is a reasonable degree of consensus amongst the decisive actors in the econo1ny about the merits and likely consequences of the Govern1nent's economic strategy; (c) the wage fixing syste1n is sufficiently centralised to permit the co-ordination of pay claims and settlements, and (d) the union 1novernent is cornmitted to full employn1ent, or 1nore irnportantly, places emplo__ymen t objectives ahead of real-wage objectives. It would seem that few' if any' of \ these conditions are satisfied in New Zealand at the 1noment. Nor is there n1uch prospect that they will be in the future.
It is not hard to illustrate the difficulty of both establishing the necessary degree of policy credibility and ensuring that wage bargaining (and other price setting) behaviour is altered in the manner intended. For example, for a union to reduce its bargaining intensity or change its preferences in accordance with the dictates of the credibility hypothesis, the following conditions would have to apply : (1) the union negotiators in question must be confident that the government can control the n1oney supply; (2) the union negotiators must believe further that the governinent \~ill control the rnoney supply and adopt a non-accotnmodating strategy regardless of any supply shocks (wage or non-wage) with which it is confronted~ (3) the union negotiators n1ust accept the government's basic theoretical presuppositions to the effect that (a) as a result of conditions (I) and (2) the rate of price inflation will faH and (b) in the context of conditions ( 1) and (2) a high average level of wage settlements will result, sooner or later, in higher unemployment and lo\\'er real output growth; ( 4) the union negotiators must believe that there is a strong probability that so1ne of their n1embers will face unen1ployn1ent if they press for a wage rise which is dee1ned, in the light of the government's announced tnonetary rule or target, to be excessive; (5) finally , the union negotiators 1nust place more weight on the preservation of their members' jobs than on the pursuit of other objectives: higher real wages, restored relativity relationships, iin proved working conditions, higher non-wage benefits and so forth. It is conceivable that some wage negotiators rnay endorse all these propositions. It is also conceivable that all negotiators rnay accept one or 2 of them. However, it is rnost in1probable that even a slim majority of negotiators would give consent to all 5 propositions. And in a wage bargaining systen1 such as that of New Zealand's, where so much still depends on trend-setting awards and historic relativities, it would only take a few important bargaining groups to reject some aspect of the credibility hypothesis for the approach to be rendered ineffective as a means for reducing the adjustment cost of a disinflationary strategy. Let us explore the 5 conditions in greater depth.
Condit ion 1
Although few econo1nists would dispute the view that governtnents should seek to exert a measure of control over the main monetary aggregates and pursue conaiatent macroeconomic policies, the experience of a number of countries would suggest that this can be a good deal more difficult than some optimists (and monetarist hardliners) might lead one to believe. For example, the Fraser Government in Australia, despite some initial success in 1977-78, completely failed during the late 1970s and early 1980s to achieve its planned reductions in monetary growth (Jones, 1983) . Likewise, the Thatcher Government in Britain, which can hardly be accused of lacking the necessary political will, found it much harder than anticipated to reduce the growth of the money supply during its first term of office. For example, in the 4 years to March 1984 the cumulative increase in M3 (the Government's main money measure) was virtually double the Treasury's original target announced in March 1980 (Davies, 1985, p. 13) . One cannot but wonder, in the light of such experiences, whether the New Zealand Treasury's nominal national income targets for 1985-86 (10-13 percent) and 1986-87 (7-9 percent) will be found similarly wanting, albeit by a much smaller margin of error than the British results. And, if these doubts are shared by a significant number of economic agents, what consequences will this have for the credibility of Labour's disinflationary strategy?
Condition 2
Some economists have suggested that the simple announcement of the government's intention to pursue a finn monetary policy is all that is required to lower inflationary expectations, and hence reduce money-wage targets. However, as Taylor (1982, p. 81) argues, the mere declaration by someone of their intention to do something is by no means sufficient to convince others that they will actually do it, especially when what the person is threatening to do may entail considerable costs. In order to establish policy credibility, therefore, further conditions must be satisfied. For example, one would want to know whether the person in question (or in this case the Labour Government) had kept previous promises of a similar kind (or had fulfilled similar threats), whether there was likely to be some element of bluff involved, whether the person's will to pursue the policy was likely to falter if the costs were found to be much higher than expected, and so forth.
Applying this reasoning to the case of a government's monetary policy, it may well be that credibility will not be attained, at least to the extent desired by policy makers, until the government is actually faced with supply shocks and rising unemployment and refuses to reflate. Yet if this is so, it means that the experience of a prolonged recession may be a necessary condition for establishing credibility. There are 2 obvious drawbacks with such a conclusion. On the one hand, if a government's threats, namely, to allow unemployment to rise unchecked if wage and price setters fail to exercise the appropriate degree of restraint, are only taken seriously when unemployment actually begins to bite, then the threat must be deemed to have failed. On the other hand, as Perry (1983, p. 601) notes, once a recession is well advanced it will be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish analytically between the respective effects of credibility and austerity on price ftxing behaviour. In fact, it may be austerity which eventually achieves the policy objectives (i.e. a fall in the rates of wage and price inflation) with credibility making no independent contribution.
In this context it is interesting to observe the Treasury view, expressed twice in the briefmg paper for the 1985 TWC, that "current expectations relating to future demand and inflation seem much higher than can be justified by present policies" (Treasury, 198SB, p. 17) . It is unclear by what method Treasury has sought to measure "current expectations", but assuming that this judgement is correct it indicates that "the market" is either not convinced that Labour will stick to its present policies regardless of their consequences for output and employment, or that it doubts that the Government's policies will have their intended effects. Whichever happens to be the case, policy makers may have to devise new ways of altering market perceptions if their policy objectives are to be secured in a relatively painless manner. 
Condition 3
It is possible, of course, that no amount of sabre rattling (or the hoisting of monetary targets) will tnake tnuch difference to inflationary expectations or wage bargaining behaviour, either because n1any significant actors in the economy do not share the Govern1nent's world view or because there are other powerful, countervailing social, institutional and econornic forces at work. For example, some union leaders may reject, for a whole host of theoretical and ideological reasons, the assumption that controlling the money supply will lower the rate of inflation and/or the assumption that there is a trade-off between real wages and en1ploy1nent (both in general and in their own particular case). And as Schelling (1982, pp. 78-79) has argued, without a consensus on theoretical propositions, the credibility hypothesis would appear doorned.
No doubt interested observers will differ in their assessment of the extent to which wage negotiators in New Zealand understand and endorse the economic theories underpinning Labour's current policy stance. There can be little question, however, that many econon1ic agents, especially within the union movement, hold serious reservations about certain crucial aspects of the Government's strategy and that unlike son1e other countries, such as Austria and Sweden, the 1najor parties involved in wage detern1ination do not share an agreed theory (be it monetarist, post-Keynesian, institutionalist or Marxist) about the detenninants of econon1ic behaviour. Nor is there rnuch hope that such a consensus can be established.
Of course, even if there was broad agreement on the fundan1entals of macroeconotnics, this would not be sufficient to guarantee a painless process of disinflation. After all, union wage negotiators may accept that a tight monetary policy will reduce inflation and n1ay accordingly revise their inflationary expectations downwards, but this will not necessarily lead then1 to alter their n1oney-wage targets. This is because their view about the future path of inflation is only one of a whole range of factors (rank-and-Hie pressures, relativity concerns, real-wage catch up, the tax structure, fiscal drag, political considerations, etc.) which influence the forn1ulation and pursuit of wage clain1s. Thus, union negotiators may still press for sizeable pay increases even in the face of declining inflation and lower inflationary expectations.
(7()11ciitic>11 ~ But, it 1nay be objected, surely union negotiators will be aware that if they demand wage rises which are inconsistent with the govern1nent's n1onetary rule some of their mernbers Inay face redundancy. Surely this threat of unemployment will be sufficient to alter pay-fixing behaviour. Leaving aside the problen1 which wage negotiators virtually always encounter in an uncertain world, nan1ely of detennining the actual level of rnoney-wage increases which is consistent with the n1aintenance of existing employn1ent levels (in the relevant finn, industry or occupational category), it cannot be assu1ned that the threat of une1nployment will have a decisive in1pact on the nature of union wage claims or the level of bargaining intensity. There are 2 rnain reasons for this.
First, in a decentralised bargaining systen1, union negotiators and their constituents ( may take the view that any harn1ful consequences resulting frorn a high wage settlernent \ :an be largely externalised, that is, passed on to others, perhaps those just entering the ,abour n1arket or those in the non-unionised sector of the econo1ny (Llewellyn, 1980, p. 51) . In short, they 1nay assun1e that they will suffer no direct adverse repercussions by puruing a big wage clairn. Alternatively they tnay conclude that the risks are worth taking. Ernployers n1ay also adopt a sin1ilar kind of reasoning. Only in a highly centralised system of wage bargaining, such as exists in Austria, does there seem much hope of overcoming this kind of collective action problem or Prisoner's Dilemma.
Condition 5
The other reason why the threat of unemployment may be an inadequate deterrent is as follows: union negotiators, especially in a decentralised bargaining system, know from experience that a big wage rise means an immedillte increase in real disposable income for their members, whereas any unemployment which may occur as a result will not be felt for some time. Assuming positive time preferences, unions may prefer higher real wages now, even at the expense of future unemployment and the possibility of slower real-wage growth in the medium term. Alternatively, they may decide that the improvements in their real (or relative) wages are worth the expected sacrifices in terms of the reduced security of e1nployment. Such reasoning is all the more likely when labour market conditions are relatively buoyant, as is currently the case in New Zealand.
To sum up, there is a variety of reasons, the absence of a broad economic consensus, doubts about a government's resolve, and uncertainty over employment prospects, why policy credibility may be difficult to establish. Moreover, even if a government's monetary policy is universally held to be credible, this will not guarantee a swift or painless reduction in the rate of inflation. Such conclusions are now accepted by economists representing a wide range of intellectual traditions. For example, Perry points out that the reduction in inflation which occurred in many countries during the early 1980s "was not exceptionally pron1 pt, and when wages finally did slow by unusually large amounts ... that develop1nent was accompanied by unusually large declines in employment" (Perry, 1983 , p. 600).
The British experience is perhaps the most graphic in this respect (Buiter and Miller, 1983) . In spite of the Thatcher Government's repeated declarations after coming to office in May 1979 that it would not accommodate excessive wage and price increases, pay negotiators appear to have taken little notice. Indeed, rather than reducing their settlen1ent levels as intended by the Government, unions pressed for even larger pay deals. The result, in short, was that the annual rate of change in average earnings accelerated from 13.4 percent at the end of the second quarter of 1979 to a peak of 22.2 percent by the third quarter of 1980. It was only with the dramatic fall in profitability and output during 1980-81, and the resultant collapse in employment in the manufacturing sector, that wage inflation began to decline. As New Zealand embarks on its own attempt to slow inflation fro1n its current rate of nearly 17 percent by means of monetary and fiscal instrurnents, such experiences are well worth pondering.
Wage fixing: Is there an optimal system? It has been com1non during the past few decades for industrial relations practitioners and specialists in tnost countries to express dissatisfaction with their system of wage detennination and to search for a better (i.e. more socially and economically efficient) system. From the 1950s to the early 1970s, for example, many American practitioners, frustrated by both the high level of strike activity and nominal wage rigidity which characterised their decentralised bargaining system, tended to gaze longingly across the Atlantic at the relatively strike-free, centralised wage fixing systems of Scandinavia, the Netherlands, West Gern1any and Austria. Since the early 1980s, however, the position has been virtually reversed. It is now the turn of European policymakers to be disgruntled. If a neo-classical prescription for the labour market is to be followed in New Zealand, a variety of refonns would be required. These could include: ( 1) lowering the "reservation" wage (i.e. the wage below which someone will choose not to work) and hence making low paid jobs more attractive (e.g. by reducing the level of unemployment benefits and other social security provisions); (2) reducing minimum award rates where there is an over-supply of labour; (3) removing the blanket coverage provision from national awards; (4) altering payment systems (e.g. the widespread introduction of profit sharing as suggested by Weitzman [ 1985] ); ( 5) reorganising the trade union movement and bargaining units along industry and enterprise lines; (6) restructuring the system of public sector pay fiXing to make it more responsive to market forces (e.g. abolishing the annual general adjustment, imposing cash limits, etc.); and (7) removing various other labour market rigidities, such as barriers to occupational entry, restrictive working practices, barriers to geographical mobility, inadequate training opportunities, and so forth. According to its proponents, such a strategy would, if pursued with vigour, bring the following results. There would be a significant decline in the importance of occupationallybased minimum-rate documents. The multi-tier system of pay settlements would be replaced eventually by a unified, single-tier system. Individual employers would no longer have to contend with a multiplicity of bargaining groups, nor with demarcation disputes. The importance of the present trend-setting pay negotiations would diminish considerably. Attempts to coordinate wage contracts by means of guidelines or the synchronising of settlement dates would be rendered unnecessary. And ability to pay criteria would replace the current emphasis on horizontal relativities. In theory, all this could be expected to greatly enhance the efficiency of the labour market. Relative wages would adjust promptly to changing market conditions. There would be greater incentives for effort and experience. Unemployment would be reduced. And, as the economy expanded and productivity improved, the average level of real wages would rise.
How realistic is such a scenario? One of the principal weaknesses of the neo-classical paradigm is that it downplays, or else completely disregards, a whole host of political, ideological, institutional and sociological forces. Thus, such matters as the concentration of organistional power in labour and product markets and the variability of bargaining intensity are often deemed to be of little importance. Similarly, no consideration is given to sociological phenomena like class antagonism, group dynamics, distributional dissent, competition for "positional" goods, feelings of relative deprivation and conflicting notions of social justice. In a world without unions, employer associations, power, coercive comparisons, the interdependence of preferences, bargaining tactics, leadership discretion, variable work effort, group solidarity and ideological conflicts it is just possible that labour markets could be made to operate in accordance with neo-classical or new classical assumptions (i.e. rational, atomistic, competitive and instantaneously-clearing). But such a world does not exist. Nor can it be brought into being.
The question, then, is whether a decentralised market-orientated bargaining system is still the "optimal solution" given the inevitable "distortions" and "imperfections" with which we must contend. The answer here, as Robert Gordon (1982) observes, is by no means self-evident. Indeed, it is doubtful whether there is such a thing as an "optimal solution". Perhaps the most that can be said is that the available empirical evidence suggests (but in no way proves) that a degree of centralisation (e.g. by means of synchronised wage rounds, trend-setter awards, or hierarchically structured, authoritative peak organisations of labour and capital) is preferable to a highly fragmented bargaining system. For Incomes policy 7 5 excunple, as various writers have noted (McCallum, 1983; Schmidt, 1984; Tarantelli, 1983) , countries like the United States, Canada and the United Kingdon1, which have reasonably decentralised bargaining systems, have generally experienced higher levels of strike activity and greater unemployment than countries such as Norway, Sweden and Austria where wage determination is more centralised. There are, of course, some exceptions to this rule. Switzerland, for example, has a decentralised bargaining system, yet shares all the virtues of its near-neighbour Austria. Japan too is often n1entioned as an exception. However, although bargaining is mainly conducted at the plant or enterprise leveL it is strongly coordinated by the 3 major trade unions during the annual "Spring Offensive" .
• On the basis of Tarantelli's definition, therefore, the Japanese systetn cannot be regarded as decent raliscd.
It is not being suggested here that variations in bargaining systems provide the sole, or even the most important, explanation for the observed differences in 1nacroeconon1ic perfonnance and levels of strike activity noted above. After all, apparent correlations do not an1ount to a causal theory. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for believing that for a country like New Zealand, with a moderate-to-high level of union coverage, a moderate level of industrial unrest, and deeply entrenched notions of comparative wage justice, the economic and social gains from a more decentralised wage fixing system tnay not be great. This does not mean that we should abandon the quest for refonn, or that we should strive instead for a Swedish-type "solidaristic wages policy" (Robinson, 1974) in which wage equalisation is sought irrespective of productivity levels or a finn's ability to pay. Rather it suggests that we should proceed with caution and without exaggerated optimism. It also suggests that it would be wise to focus our energies on reforming those aspects of the existing system which are most obviously inefficient and conflict-producing . One such feature is the occupational character of our union and bargaining structures.
The harmful consequences of an occupational, as opposed to an industry-based, system of wage determination are well known and do not need to be laboured. Amongst other things it leads to the pursuit of narrow, particularistic concerns, it generates additional tension and conflict in the workplace, it confronts larger employers with a multiplicity of competing bargaining groups, and it prevents ability-to-pay factors from playing a significant role in wage determination, certainly ~t the national award level. Industry-based bargaining, on the other hand, generally avoids these problems. Furthermore, if it is married with an element of enterprise bargaining, as is the case in Austria, or with flexible pay1nent systems it provides scope both for a degree of central coordination (when this is deemed desirable for macroeconomic reasons) and for a measure of wage flexibility.
There is but one difficulty. Unfortunately it is serious. Experience suggests that industrial relations reform, especially in the absence of a war, revolution or dictatorship, can be time consuming and expensive (i.e. in terms of the extra transaction costs and strike costs). It is perhaps salutary to be rerninded that the Swedish central union organisation, the LO, voted in 1912 to institute the principle of industry-based unionism. It took some 60 years to implement this decision (Visser, 1983, p. 15) . Similarly, the Norwegian LO agreed in 1923 to endorse industrial unionisrn, but even today, 62 years later, there are many small occupational unions (Visser, 1983, p. 15) . In fact, although industrial unionism and industry-based wage bargaining is endorsed by most trade union confederations around the world) it has only been fully implemented in a few countries. Moreover, in only 2 cases, Austria and West Germany, was industrial unioniSin introduced speedily and without significant resistance from employers or workers. In both cases this occurred in the aftermath of World War II and the refonns were imposed by the occupying powers. In New Zealand perhaps the most that can be hoped for in the short tenn is the graduaJ diminution in the importance and coverage of national awards as paid-rate documents, a greater reliance on tnini.In urn wage legislation to protect the lower paid, the development of rnore flexible second-tier bargaining, and sotne agreement on new composite wage settlements in certain sectors. However, even these developments could prove something of a mixed blessing, as tnay become apparent during the next few wage rounds.
76 Jonathan Boston The -1986 In considering the prospects for the 1985-86 wage round it ia important to bear in mind the unique character of the present wage fiXing environment. To start with, this Ia the first time since the emergence of annual wage rounds in the late 1960s that bargaining is likely to proceed in the absence of a General Wage Order (GWO) before, during or after the round. Second, bargaining will take place in the aftennath of an extended wage and price freeze, a significant devaluation, and the most sustaiped period of economic growth since 19'12-197 4. Third, it will be the first "nonnal" round since [1981] [1982] , and may yet prove to be the frrst period of collective bargaining for well over a decade which has been conducted in the absence of formal guidelines, legal restrictions, or threats to impose statutory controls. Finally, the round will take place in the context of extensive tripartite consultations, various reforms to the wage riXing system in the private sector, significant taxation and social policy changes, and a governmental detennination to maintain a fum, non-accommodating monetary policy.
In terms of its overall economic strategy, the Labour Government has 2 principal objectives on the wages front: firstly, to ensure that the growth of average earnings in the year to September 1986 is relatively restrained -which means no more than about 12 percent (Treasury, 1985B, p. 6); and secondly, to ensure that there is a much greater variation in settlement levels than has been the case during the past decade. This applies to both national awards and second-tier agreements.
What are the prospects of these aims being fulftlled? Those who take an optimistic view rest their case on one or more of the following considerations: (1) the Government's pursuit of tight monetary and fiscal policies; (2) the absence of a GWO; (3) the impact of the recent economic policy changes on the degree of employer resistance to pay claims; ( 4) the loyalty of the union movement to the Labour Government, as evidenced by the restraint exercised during the 1984-1985 wage round; (5) the changes to the wage fixing system as a result of the Wages Accord in September 1984, in particular the introduction of voluntary arbitration; (6) the positive impact of the planned tax cuts and social policy changes on real disposable • mcomes. Point (I) has already been dealt with the depth, so there is no need to repeat all the arguments here. As for point (2), it is doubtful, certainly on the basis of overseas experience, whether the absence of a GWO will prevent a substantial rise in wage rates. On the other hand, the evidence of the 1970s (Boston, 1984, pp. 299-300) suggests that if a GWO is granted in the absence of explicit restrictions on bargaining freedom the likelihood of excessive wage growth will be increased. With respect to point (3), it seems unlikely that the Government's recent measures to enhance business competition, such as the removal of some import controls and the deregulation of certain industries, will make a major difference to the level of employer resistance in pay bargaining in the short term. And, even if it does in particular cases, the occupational structure of wage determination in New Zealand will tend to mitigate the effects of this on actual pay settlements.
Clearly one of the most fascinating issues concerns the extent to which the political loyalties of the union leadership will lead them to exercise their discretionary power to restrain the size of settlements, point ( 4). There can be little doubt that this was one of the contributing factors to the "success" (i.e. in terms of securing relatively low settlements) of the 1984-85 wage round. However, it is improbable that political loyalties will count to the same extent in the immediate future. First, as is well known, there are now some serious strains in the relationship between the industrial and parliamentary wings of the labour movement. Second, union leaders may simply fmd themselves unable to prevent individual bargaining groups formulating and pursuing big wage claims. Lastly, it should be noted that political loyalty was neither the only, nor even the most important, ..
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Incomes policy 7 7 reason for the 1noderation shown in the 1984-1985 round. Other factors included the compressed, almost artificial nature of the round, the economic "crisis", the "spirit of consensus", the Governn1ent's overly optimistic inflation forecasts, the introduction of Family Care, and the decision of 1nost unions to defer many of their bargaining de1nands until the 1985-1986 round. Most of these conditions no longer apply.
With regard to point (5): it is difficult to assess at this stage what i.Jnpact the introduction of voluntary arbitration in late 1984 will have on the overall spread and average level of award settlements during the next few wage rounds. It is certainly possible, however, that voluntary arbitration will become, as Kirk suggests, "one of the more significant elements of wage fixing in the future" (Kirk, 1985, p. 4) . As it stands, the new procedures enable either employers or unions to refuse to take disputed clairns to the Arbitration Court. This provision is unlikely to affect the bargaining behaviour of relatively powerful groups, such as the 1nain trend-setting groups, since they have displayed a reluctance over 1nany years to go to the Court. Nevertheless, it is probable that so1ne employers will use the new provision against poorly organised and reasonably passive groups of workers in non-strategic sectors of the econo1ny (e.g. clerical workers, shop en1ployees, catering staff, cleaners, etc.). Should they do so, there is a distinct possibility that the award settlen1ents of such groups will lag well behind those of more powerful unions and that traditional relativity relationships will be broken. This, of course, means that future wage rounds could witness a greater spread of pay settlements and a somewhat lower growth in average earnings than might otherwise have occurred. It could also result in the undermining of awards as paid-rate documents in certain sectors.
The final reason for optimism relates to the August Budget (point (6). The argument here is that by cutting taxes and improving welfare assistance the Government can "buy off' pressure for substantial wage increases. It is impossible to assess the impact of such a strategy until the details of the Governtnent's package are known. However, it is clear that much will depend on (a) the actual magnitude of the tax cuts; (b) their timing; (c) their distributional bias, and (d) the willingness of the union InoveJnent to trade tax cuts for wage rises. To date the unions have been unsympathetic to such an approach (Brosnan, 1983 ) . Whether this attitude changes remains to be seen.
Turning to the grounds for pessimism: What reasons tnight there be for expecting a significant short-tenn acceleration in the rate of wage inflation (i.e. to 15 percent or 1nore)? In general it can be argued that fluctuations in 1noney wages are influenced by 2 principal factors: (1) the relative power of unions and en1ployers; and (b) the willingness of the various parties to exploit their power (i.e. the level of bargaining intensity).
The relative power of unions and employers obviously depends on a host of 1natters (e.g. organisational strength , the degree of solidarity, the level of output, the level of profitability, and labour tnarket conditions). In the current circun1stances n1ost of the evidence points to the union moven1ent being in a stronger bargaining position than 12 months ago, and possibly its strongest position since the mid-1970s. Record profits are being reported. Productivity has unproved. Capital utilisation re1nains high. Exports are continuing to grow strongly. Private sector investn1ent is buoyant. And, despite signs that econotnic activity has peaked and that a rnild downturn has begun, business confidence remains at a reasonable level (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, 1985) . Equally significant, total employment has grown rapidly -by over 40 000 in the year to March 1985, unemployment has fallen, and shortages of labour have been reported, especially for skilled and professional workers (e.g. medical staff, engineers, accountants, senior n1anagers, ec-onomists, technicians, computer operators, tradesmen, electricians, police, anned forces personnel, chefs, etc.). Tight labour markets conditions of this nature will necessarily reduce en1ployer resistance to large wage claiins, notwithstanding attempts by the Employers' Federation to prevent "soft" settlements. The pritnary questio~, therefore, is whether the union n1oVe111ent chooses to exploit its current advantages to achieve substantial pay increases. At present this remains uncertain. Nevertheless, there are Inany reaons for expecting some escalation in the degree of union "pushfulness":
(1) Historically or enterprises of a similar type will then seek similu wage rates and conditiom of employment via horizontal relativity arguments. Such developments were a feature of the last major economic upturn in the early 1970s.
Another factor concerns the impact of the freeze and the devaluation on real wages.
In the 3 years to March 19 85, real pre-tax ordinary time weekly earnings fell on average by 11.1 percent. Since then real wages have fallen even further. To be sure, the decline in real disposable incomes has been leas severe (about S.S percent on average in the 3 years to March 1985), though for some groups it has been substantial (e.g. the third quintile has suffered a fall in real disposable incomes of 9.4 percent in the 3 years to March 1 985) (Department of Statistics, 1985) . Those who believe in the inevitability of a wage rebound following a period of statutory controls and realwage cuts (and this includes most monetarists) and those who hold to some kind of target real-wage hypothesis (and this includes many post-Keynesians) must, it seems, expect a significant acceleration in money wage growth in the near future. If they are proved wrong, some revision of the respective theories may well be necessary. A further reason for expecting an increase in bargaining intensity relates to the fact that the 1985-86 round will be the first "normal" period of bargaining for many years. Consequently, most groups will have long bargaining agendas -the restoration of lost relativities, the resolution of anomalies, the restructuring of awards, improvements in working conditions (health and safety provisions, etc.), new and improved fringe benefits, additional allowances, and so on. Moreover, many groups will probably be willing to take their time in order to achieve the best possible deal. This means, in effect, that resort to strike action (or strike threats) could become an integral part of their bargaining strategy. Yet another matter concerns the prospects for inflation during the next year. The Treasury is predicting an annual rate of 12 percent by March 1986, presumably with the rate falling steadily after that until the introduction of GST (Treasury, 19858, p. 1 0). However, this is contingent, amongst other things, upon a moderate wage round and a reasonably stable exchange rate. In the absence of one or other of these conditions {or both), the rate could be h~er. Given the current degree of uncertainty surrounding the future path of prices, some intensification of bargaining intensity can be expected. As an incidental point, it would seem that the Treasury's inflation forecasts have been remarkably optin1istic. In late 1984, for example, it was assumed that the rate of inflation in the year to March 1986 would be about 6 percent (Treasury, 1985A, p. 2) and that the 1985-86 wage round would be no higher than the 1984-85 round.
To be sure, the 6 percent figure has now been revised upwards to 12 percent. But even this prediction seems low, especially in the light of the recent 5.1 percent June quarter. Indeed, for the forecast to prove accurate it will mean that the rate of fnfla.
tion will have to slow more rapidly than occurred during the iust 9 months of the wage-price freeze implemented in June 1982. This is very doubtful (unless the exchange rate appreciates considerably in value). Finally, there is a possibility of a widespread wage push being triggered by large (i.e. 15 percent plus), well publicised, and destablising settlernents occurring during the early stages of the round. The Higher Salaries Comn1ission will be reporting in September and it is likely to increase the salaries of those under its jurisdiction by 20-30 percent (which is the reported level of wage drift in the upper echelons of the private sector since April 1981 ). Pay rises of this tnagnitude are bound to have psychological effects, if not some political ramifications. Quite apart fro1n the report of the Higher Salaries Con1n1ission, destabilising settlen1ents could come from a wide range of bargaining groups whose labour is currently in short supply. If other groups then seek to re-establish their lost relativity, which is likely, conflict over income shares could becL'!ne both widespread and intense. 1 t is worth rernern bering that this is precisely what happened in New Zealand (1969) (1970) and in Australia (1981) (1982) , to rnention only a few instances. To sum up: unless there is an unexpectedly sharp con traction in econotnic activity during the latter half of 1985 similar to that which occurred in 1982, the bargaining power of organised labour during the 1985-86 wage round should re1nain above the level of the past 3-4 years. In addition, past experience indicates that, given the current econo1nic context, there could be an upsurge in bargaining intensity. Indeed, the only reasons for thinking otherwise relate to the union tnovernent's political affinity to the Governtnent and the positive effects of the planned tax and welfare changes on real disposable inco1nes during 1986. As it stands, real wages and real disposable incomes must be near to their minilnum acceptable levels. It is difficult to envisage, therefore, that further cuts in living standards will be readily tolerated. This being so, one would expect that n1ost union negotiators will accept nothing less in the coming round than an an1ount equivalent to the rate of inflation during their [1984] [1985] contract period (of 10 Inonths). This could 1nean national award increases averaging 12-14 percent plus wage drift of 1-2 percent , that is, unless ernployers are able to demonstrate an unprecedented level of solidarity or refuse to allow disputed claims to go to arbitration. Such an outcome, of course , would not be welcomed by the Government. It would mean higher inflation in the short tenn and almost certainly higher unetnployment in the n1edium term. Moreover, if the exchange rate falls to compensate for the loss of international con1petitiveness, short-tenn inflation rates will go even higher. And, if the exchange rate does not adjust, perhaps because of high interest rates, we could have a rather unpleasant, though less dran1atic, replay of the British experience in 1980-82 . What is to be done? Assuming that the 3 parties fail to reach an agreement on a wage guideline, the Government has a range of options. Unfortunately they are all potentiallY. unattractive: (I) The first possibility would be to put the clock back and seek to restrain wages by n1eans of non-n1arket instru1nents (i.e. statutory controls). Such a strategy, however, is likely to arouse fierce opposition, and may sirnply forestall an inevitable adjustJnent problem. In short, statutory controls could well prove ineffective and inefficient. (2) A second option would be for the Government to announce a wage guideline unilaterally, as National did on several occasions before the freeze and as the Callaghan Government did in both 1977 and 1978 . The difficulty here is that if the guideline is "unrealistic" (e.g. in current conditions under 10 percent) it will simply be ignored. And yet if it is "realistic" it will probably make little difference to the actual level of wage settlements. (3) An alternative possibility would be to announce a guideline and then try and defend it through selective measures of one kind or another (e.g. price controls, tax penalties, regulations, the "rnanipulation" of governn1ent contracts, the abolition of the Higher Salaries Commission , or a delay to the implementation of its report, etc.). But such a strategy is likely to be messy in adJninistrative terms, is bound to cause distortions to relative prices, and on past experience (1979) (1980) is likely to generate very considerable levels of strike activity (Boston, 1984, pp. 201-210 ) . ( 4) The final option is to avoid guidelines, legal restrictions and sanctions, and rely in-stead on a mixture of moral suulon, jaw·bontng, ttx. cm~peaaatioll and market mechanisms (i.e. monetary policy and competition poUoy), with a bit of hope and prayer added for good measure. In accordance with tbla 8C1D1rio the primary aim must be to ensure that the early wage settlements, and particularly the main trendsetting awards, are kept as low as possible (i.e. nearer to 10 percent than to 15 percent). Should the more-market approach fail to keep the growth of average earnings to a level consistent with the Government•s monetary objectives, it looks as if we will simply have to put up with higher short-term inflation and more unemployment. This is unpalatable, but it may tum out to be unavoidable. For to accommodate a significant wage push by pursuing a lax monetary policy will merely delay the hour of reckoning. As Max Carden has lamented, if wages go through the roof "the real choice for the government is deflation and unemployment now or deflation and unemployment later" (Carden, 1982, p. 113) . It must be sincerely hoped that the Labour Government is not obliged to make such a choice.
Conclusion
Some 14 years ago the New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council made the following observation:
It is very much easier to analyse the reaaons why the processes of income detenninatk>n can cause an excessively rapid spiral of costs and prices, even in conditions of relatively depressed demand, than it is to find remedies for the problems concerned (Monetary and Economic Council, 1971, p. 11 7) .
Despite a good deal of experimentation since the early 1970s, both here and overseas, we are still no nearer to finding painless methods of disinflation. The Labour Government is now em barking on a new approach to the control of inflation, new at least for this country. If it proves successful, in the sense that we are able to over the next few years to avoid the usual transition costs of higher unemployment and lower real output, it will be a remarkable achievement. If it proves unsuccessful, it will indicate that we live in a cruel world where th~ choice is not so much between market solutions and non-market solutions, but between market failure and non-market failure. Which outcome is worse is not an easy matter to resolve. For those who suffer the resultant indignity of unemployment, the effects are the same.
